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The  Community  and  the  United  States  are  the  two  main  international 
agricultural  trading  powers.  Consequently both parties have  major 
responsibilities  to  each other,  as  well  as  to  the rest of  the  world  to  help 
ensure  the  well  being of  agricultural  trade and  the  respect of  the  GATT  rules 
which  govern it. 
World  markets  for many  agricultural  products are  now  out of  balance  - a 
situation causing  widespread  concern.  No  one  trading entity is  responsible 
for  this:  nor  can  the efforts of  one  party alone  correct  the situation. 
Policy changes  by all  parties  concerned are required. 
In order  to make  available  to  a  wide  audience  the views  of  the  Commission  on 
this subject.  this publication includes  the essential points  made  recently in 
speeches  by  Vice  President Andriessen  to: 
The  E.C./U.S.  journalist conference. 
Maastricht  6  June,  1985 
The  25th General  Assembly  of  the  European Animal  Feed Manufacturers, 
Knokke  7  June,  1985 
The  Chamber  of  Commerce  of  Greater  Kansas  City. 
Kansas  City,  Mission  25  June  1985. E.C/U.S.  JOURNALIST  CONFERENCE 
MAASTRICHT  6  JUNE  1985 
We  in Europe  today are embarked  on  our  own  effort to create a  union  - an 
economic  and  political union,  blending  our nation states into what  will one 
day be  a  United States of  Europe.  We  know  that the  United States of America 
supports  us  in this endeavour,  not  only because  of  our shared  ideals,  but 
because America  needs  a  Europe  which  is strong,  a  Europe  which  can  speak with 
one voice. 
It is against  this background  that  I  want  to address  my  remarks  on 
agricultural  trade. 
Agricultural  trade  is big business,  not  least  for  the  European Community  and 
the  United States. 
Our  combined  trade  flow  in agricultural goods,  with all our  partners,  is 
running at about  a  million dollars a  minute. 
Business  on  this scale creates  its own  problems,  if for  no  other reason  than 
its size. 
It is bound  to  have  a  marked  impact  on,  and  be  affected by,  domestic 
agricultural conditions,  both  in the  Community  and  the  United States,  as  well 
as  elsewhere. 
These  massive  trade  flows  take  place  in a  world  beset with many  difficulties, 
such as: 
*chronic over-supply for  many  farm  commodities; 
*erratic and  even irrational currency movements; 
*problems  with  the  functioning  of  the  GATT-based 
multilateral  trade  system. 
The  problems  seem  to  grow  each year.  Indeed,  they  seem  to approach what  in 
nuclear  physics  is  known  as  the critical mass  which  in turn may  lead  to  a 
series of  chain reactions. 
Everyone  involved  in formulating agricultural  policy therefore bears  an 
enormous  responsibility.  The  Community  and  the  United  States represent by  far 
the  largest  international agricultural  trading entities.  So  the 
responsibility to  which  I  have  referred  must  be  carried to  a  significant 
extent by  U.S.  and  EEC  policy-makers. - 2  -
Before  I  analyse  how  we  should  measure  up  to our responsibilities,  let me  say 
this.  Not  all the  problems  can be  solved,  even  if the  political will is 
present.  But  the  insoluble  problems  are often  those which are  false  or 
imagined.  The  others,  given  the  political will,  are all capable of  solution. 
It is  therefore  imperative  to  distinguish between  the  real and  the  imaginary 
problems  in order  to  focus  correctly any  remedial  action. 
It is a  basic  human  weakness,  when 
place  the  responsibility for one's 
known  in  the world  of agriculture. 
European  Community.  It is  invoked 
to  those  on  the  opposite  shore. 
confronted with difficulties,  to seek  to 
plight  upon  others.  This  reaction is well 
It occurs  between  the  Member  States of  the 
on both sides of  the Atlantic,  with  respect 
For  example,  a  thesis which  has  many  supporters  in  the  United States,  is  that 
the  acute  problems  now  facing  American  farmers  stem directly from  the  various 
mechanisms  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy.  I  do  not  believe that  thesis 
stands  up  to examination. 
In  the  seventies,  when  international markets  were  buoyant,  world  trade  in 
agriculture  expanded by  some  15%  per  annum.  There  were  few  clouds  on  the 
horizon. 
When  world  trade  in agriculture  took  a  downturn  in  the eighties,  certain 
things  became  more  apparent: 
*the  interdependence  of  agriculture  on  a  world  scale  became  more  obvious 
*the desire  to  find  scapegoats  grew. 
The  scapegoats  have  been  found,  and  they  take different  forms. 
For  some,  it is a  dissatisfaction with  GATT  provisions.  One  of  the  reasons 
for  dissatisfaction stems  directly  from  the  exceptions  which  were  made  from 
the  basic  GATT  rules  for  primary  products. 
But  these  exceptions  were  not  introduced at  the  insistence of  the  Community  or 
its Member  States.  They  were  introduced by  the  United States,  because 
Congress  wanted  them,  in order  to maintain  U.S.  domestic  prices above  world 
levels. 
These  exceptions still form  part of  the  rules  in force.  In  particular there 
is  the  "waiver",  granted  on  a  temporary basis  to  the  United States  over  30 
years  ago.  There  is also  a  general  derogation  permitting export  subsidies  on 
primary  products.  When  this derogation was  examined  by  GATT  in  1958,  the  USA 
was  foremost  in rejecting calls  for  a  prohibition of  export  subsidies  on  such 
products. - 3  -
These  exceptions  and  derogations existed when  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
was  set up.  The  Community  was  not  granted a  "waiver".  It obtained  the  right 
to  support  its internal prices above  world  levels  through  import  levies and 
export  refunds  - and it purchased  this right by  consolidating its import 
duties  on  a  number  of  products. 
Let us also not  forget  that  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy was  set  up  soon 
after food  ration books  had  been discarded  in Europe  and  starvation  remained 
in  the minds  of  many  of  our  people. 
The  backbone  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy is its system of  intervention, 
import  levies and export  refunds.  Although  this system is compatible with  the 
GATT,  it suffers  from  a  particular disadvantage. 
Its mechanisms  are clearly visible.  It is  'transparent'. 
But  it is an error to assume  that  is mechanisms  distort  trade  more  than other 
less visible  tools. 
A good  example  of  the  less visible  tool  is special credit programmes  for 
agriculture.  Such  programmes  have  enabled  farmers  in some  countries  to enjoy 
access  to  loans  at  lower  interest  rates  than other sectors of  the  economy. 
This  stimulus  to  agriculture  cannot fail  to  have  an  impact  on  international 
trade. 
Another  example,  which  is wrongly  considered  to  be  more  trade-neutral  is  the 
system of deficiency  payments. 
This  too  can  have  a  marked  impact  on  production,  consumption and  trade.  The 
United  Kingdom,  before it joined  the  Community,  applied a  deficiency  payments 
system.  But  its agricultural  production and  consumption developed  for  each 
main  commodity at similar rates both before and after it switched  to  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy.  Thus  the  theory of  the distorting effects  of  the 
Community  system are not  borne out by  the  facts. 
The  essential point  is that  few  support measures  are neutral with  respect 
either to  production or  trade. 
Consequently,  if we  focus  attention on  the  trade distorting effects  of  one  or 
other policy  instrument,  we  may  deflect attention  from  the  underlying 
problems.  This  may  enliven  the  debate,  but will not enlighten it. - 4  -
As  a  matter of  fact,  I  found  quite  some  enlightenment  regarding  the  problems 
facing agriculture in a  speech which  I  read  in December  last year,  before  I 
took  up  my  present duties  in  the  European  Commission.  It was  a  speech made  in 
Washington by Secretary Block,  setting the  scene  for  the  U.S.  Farm Bill.  He 
made  three points: 
*  first:  "New  Advances  in agricultural science will  lead  to  further 
large  increases  in farm yields". 
*  second:  "We  can  no  longer afford large,  explosive  open-ended  budget 
expenditures  for  farm  price-support  programmes". 
*  third:  "  It is  our  responsibility to  challenge  foreign competitors, 
rather  than  unthinkingly aid and abet  them". 
Well,  I  gave  John  Block  a  high score  for  the  first  two  points,  but  not  quite 
such a  good  mark  for  the  third one. 
We  have  studied with interest  the  development  of  the  Farm  Bill. 
We  read  in  the  U.S.D.A.'s notes  on  the  Farm  Bill,  that  in recent  years  the 
world  recession,  the  high value of  the dollar and  problems  of debtor nations 
have  made  it very difficult for  U.S.  agricultural  commodities  to  compete  in 
the  international market  place. 
We  read  that  this  problem has  been  aggravated  by  the  high and  rigid  levels  of 
U.S.  price and  income  supports. 
I  do  not  want  to  dwell  too  much  on  these  points.  I  simply  want  to  say  that we 
understand  these  problems  and  the  political  pressures  which  they generate. 
We  too,  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic,  have  analysed  the  problems  which  face 
our agricultural  policy and  we  have  made  a  start  in  trying  to  solve  them.  As 
long  ago  as  July  1983,  in  the  so-called document  500  (1),  the  Commission 
pointed  to  the  need  for  adaptations  of  the  CAP  required because of  changed 
circumstances.  We  argued  that short-term palliatives  could not  remedy  the 
problems,  and more  fundamental  changes  were  needed  to put  the  CAP  on  a  sound 
economic  and  financial  footing.  Market  disciplines  had  to  be  accepted  and  a 
greater accent  placed  on  production at a  competitive price. 
Since  then,  Commission  proposals  have  led  to  important  Council  decisions. 
We  now  have  production  quotas  for  milk  and  no  longer an  open ended  support 
system for most  other major  products,  with  the  generalised application of 
"guarantee  thresholds".  For  wine,  significant  policy changes  have  been made 
to  bring  horne  to  producers  the  realities of  the market. 
(1)  COM(83)  500  of  28  July  1983 - 5  -
The  1985/86  farm price negotiations  consitituted further  progress.  For  the 
third consecutive year support prices in the  Community  have  been adjusted by 
amounts  below inflation and  in certain cases  prices  have  been cut.  In 
addition the  Commission  through various  market  management  instruments  has 
tried to make  producers more  aware  of market  realities.  There  is of  course 
bound  to be  a  time  lag before  producers  respond  fully  to  these  new  signals but 
the  impact  of  the  policy changes  is already beginning  to  be felt. 
At  Siena  in May  1985,  the Agriculture Ministers  of  the  Community  agreed  to 
take a  new  look at  the  long-term prospects  in this  framework.  I  told  them 
very clearly  that  the  only  sound approach  for  the  CAP  in  the  medium  and  the 
long  term is to give  to market  prices a  greater role  in guiding  supply and 
demand.  If we  do  not  succeed  in this,  we  shall  find ourselves  sooner or later 
extending  the  empire  of quotas.  But  quotas  are no  real  solution;  for  if the 
limitation of  quantity is compensated by higher prices,  this  in  turn  reduces 
demand  on our  own  markets  and  makes  our exports  less competitive. 
In our examination of  the  prospects  for  the CAP,  we  are  looking at external 
trade.  The  basic premises  from  which we  start include our determination: 
*  to maintain our  position on  the world market,  taking account 
of  future  demand; 
*  to  retain our  system of  import  levies and  export  refunds, 
which are  in conformity with our  international obligations; 
*  to  implement  Community  preference,  which  is  the  equivalent 
at  the Community  level  of  the priority given  to domestic 
production  in a  national market. 
As  regards  the export  system of  the  Community,  we  have  to  consider whether  the 
difference between  our  prices  and  those  on world  markets  should be  covered  in 
whole  or part by  our  own  producers.  In this  context  there exist a  number  of 
possible models,  of  which  one  example  is  the  Community's  sugar  regime. 
Another basic  consideration  is  that  trade  in agriculture,  like trade  in other 
products,  is a  two-way  street.  Europe  remains  the  world's first importer of 
agricultural  products  but it is now  also  the world's  second exporter.  ·The 
Community,  if it wishes  to  enhance its exports,  must  respect  the possibility 
of  imports.  This  does  not  however  exclude  the  question of adjusting our 
import  protection,  if necessary,  to correct certain imbalances. - 6  -
At  the  level of  trade mechanisms,  we  are  exam1n1ng  the  possible 
diversification of our  instruments,  to  include  those  used  by competitors  on 
the  world market,  such as  export  credits,  long-term supply agreements,  and 
linkage  between commercial  exports  and  food  aid.  A number  of  questions also 
have  to  be  examined  concerning  the better managment  of  import  levies and 
export  refunds.  Finally,  we  must  see  how  we  could  encourage  the  export of 
higher added-value  produce. 
The  US  too  is  in  the  process  of  formulating  a  new  farm  policy. 
This  policy  is  presented as  being  "market-oriented". 
The  Community  cannot  object  to  such an orientation in principle.  But  we  are 
concerned  to  know  what  it means  in practice. 
The  Farm  Bill calls  for  plans  to  be  drawn  up  to  remove  what  are described as 
major agricultural  trade barriers.  Such action,  which  is envisaged  on  a 
bilateral basis,  could  run  counter  to  the  GATT  based multilateral  trade  system. 
Another  question  is whether  the  new  Farm  Bill will  really be  more  market 
oriented.  In other words,  to  what  extent will  reductions  in  the  loan  rate  be 
compensated by  other forms  of  support  such  as  deficiency payments?  How  does 
one  reconcile  the  stated objective of  market  orientation with  the  Export 
Enhancement  Programme?  What  effect will  this  programme  have  on  world  markets? 
I  put  these  questions  not  in an  agressive  manner  but  to  illustrate our 
legitimate concern.  Personally,  I  do  not  believe  in  "megaphone  diplomacy".  I 
prefer  to  discuss  matters  in a  calm  and  rational  way.  I  know  that  there are 
no  simple  solutions  to  these  complex  problems. 
In my  view,  any  objective analysis of  the  present  situation leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  we  have  a  common  problem. - 7 -
Existing agricultural policies,  in  the  Community,  in the  US  and  in many  other 
countries  lead  to  an excess  of  supply over  demand  and  thus  risk a 
destabilisation of  world markets.  The  US  government  has  proposed drastic 
policy changes.  We  on  this side of  the  Atlantic believe  that evolutionary 
reform is better than revolution.  Perhaps  it is a  difference of  pace  and 
style,  rather  than a  difference of  direction.  We  all know  that  a  continuation 
of  present  policies will  lead  to  increasing surpluses  and  costs,  as  well  as  to 
increasing friction and  conflict  in international  trade.  Moreover  these 
policies do  not serve  the best  interests either of  our  societies as  a  whole  or 
the  real  needs  of agriculture.  Change  must  therefore be accepted. 
All  commentators  however  recognise  that adjustment  of  policy whether  in  the 
Community,  the  USA  or elsewhere  is painful  and  politically hazardous. 
On  this point  too,  I  learned  a  lesson recently  from  an editorial  in  the 
Washington  Post.  Discussing  the  Farm  Bill,  the newspaper  remarked  that 
"economists usually talk as  though  people  welcomed  economic  growth.  People 
welcome  higher pay for  what  they're used  to  doing,  where  they're  used  to  doing 
it.  But  economic  growth  strikes a  much  harsher bargain.  It makes  society 
richer,  but  only by  requiring  people  to  leave  their accustomed  ways  of  life. 
It imposes  immense  strain on  the  people  directly caught  in it, a  kind  of  cost 
to which economics  pays  little attention". 
Moreover,  for  the  Community,  the  future  adjustments  are more  problematic 
because  of  the  imminent arrival of  Spain and  Portugal.  This  enlargement  of 
the  Community  from  ten  to  twelve  is  an  achievement  of  major  political 
significance.  It will  however  entail  changes  in many  agricultural sectors,  in 
competitive  forces  and  in  the  Community's  degree  of  self-sufficiency for  some 
products.  Consequential  changes  in trading patterns will  therefore  result. 
I  have  tried  to  give  you  some  reflections  on  the  progress  of efforts  to adapt 
agricultural  policy,  both  on  our  side  and  on  your  side of  the Atlantic.  What 
do  the  results  show? 
To  a  large extent it is  too  early  to  judge.  Adjustments  in both  the  USA  and 
the  Community  to  the  new  circumstances  of  the  1980's  have  been  initiated.  But 
generally  these  adjustments  have  only been partially implemented  and  thus  the 
full  impact  has  still to  be  experienced. 
Nonetheless,  where  decisive action has  been  taken,  notably  in the  Community 
with milk  quotas,  the  results are  already significant. -8-
Perhaps  even more  important,  attitudes  of all involved  in agriculture  have 
changed.  This  is a  desirable and  necessary development.  Recognition of a 
problem is a  precondition of  its resolution.  A few  years  ago  many  refused  to 
even acknowledge  the existence of  increasing  problems  of  over-supply brought 
forth by a  variety of  policy support measures.  Such attitudes are now  more 
rare. 
We  in  the Community  will continue  to  play our part  to help  to  resolve  the 
problems  facing  trade  in agricultural  products. 
We  will  do  this  in our  internal deliberations  and decisions,  despite  their 
shortcomings. 
We  will do  this  through negotiation with our  international  trade partners,  in 
particular in  the established institutions such as  GATT.  Here  too  the 
shortcomings are evident,  but with a  will,  improvements  can be  made. 
We  count  on our American  partners  to  do  the  same. 25TH  GENERAL  ASSEMBLY  OF  THE 
EUROPEAN  ANIMAL  FEED  MANUFACTURERS 
KNOKKE  7  JUNE,  1985 
The  Community  produces  about  82  million  tonnes  of  compound  feed.  The  increase 
over  the last 10  years  has  been of  the  order of  401.  Those  82  million  tonnes 
are worth  25,000 million ECU.  The  figures are  impressive  :  1,000 million  ECU 
for every year since  the birth of  your Federation. 
The  compound  feed  industry also has  a  key  role  to  play  in relations with our 
trading partners. 
As  a  whole it uses  451  imported  raw materials.  It is safe  to  say that half  of 
this figure  is  from  the  United States of  America. 
Mr.  Block,  however,  is in a  much  more  comfortable  position  than  I  am. 
The  Commissioner  for agriculture must  necessarily  take  into account  equally 
both  the  interests of  the  raw  material  producers  - that is to  say,  the grain 
farmers  - and  the  feed  consumers,  i.e.  the  livestock producers. 
He  must  weigh  the  interests of  producers,  dealers  and  the  processing  industry 
against one  another. 
He  must  be mindful  of  the  harmonious  development  of  world  trade without  losing 
sight of  the  need  to  export  European  farm  produce. 
Finally,  he  must  weigh  up  all  these  - often conflicting - interests within  the 
framework  of  increasingly stricter budgetary discipline. 
Mr.  Block has  a  much  easier time.  He  sells his  raw  materials  here,  where  they 
find a  ready market  and  no  obstacles are placed  in his  way. 
The  recent  import  figures  are eloquent  on  this point. 
In a  word,  Mr  Block  comes  he~e, as  far as  feedingstuffs  are  concerned as  a 
very successful  salesman and  we  are  very  happy  to  have  him  here. 
I  am  happy  to meet  him  here  as  a  buyer  of  American agricultural  products.  I 
hope  that Mr.  Block will  welcome  me  in  two  weeki'  time  in Washington as  a 
modest  seller of  European agricultural products. -2-
It is buying  - and  selling - that  makes  international  trade;  it is also  the 
basis of agricultural  trade  relations. 
This  brings  me  almost  automatically  to  the  trade relations between  the 
European  Community  and  the  United States of  America. 
In my  speech  I  want  to deal  with this subject first. 
Not  only  because  Mr  Block  is with  us  today but also  because  of  the  great 
importance  I  attach  to our mutual  relations. 
Recently,  the  media  have  been  suggesting  that  we  are at daggers  drawn.  And 
even  those  responsible  for agricultural  policy - on  both sides  of  the 
Atlantic  - are  apt  to  use  strong  language. 
The  EEC  and  and  the  United  States are  two  agricultural  superpowers. 
Our  combined  share of world  trade  in  farm  produce at  301  shows  clearly not 
only  the  impact  of  our  two  agricultural  industries but also  their 
interdependence. 
But  interdependence doesn't mean  that  we  have  to  tell one  another what  sort of 
agricultural  policy  to  conduct. 
In  the  last  few  decades  the  United  States  and  the  Community  have  developed 
agricultural policies  that are best  suited  to  their respective  production 
structures and  to  their own  particular economic  and  social  circumstances. 
It is not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  two  agricultural  policies differ in 
several  respects. 
Traditionally  there are  a  number  of  important structural differences,  such as 
the  area under  cultivation and  the  size of  the  farming  population.  Over  the 
years,  however,  these differences  have  become  much  smaller.  We  must  not. 
forget  that  since  the  introduction of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  half  of 
the  Community's  farmers  and  farm  workers  have  left  the  land. 
On  the American side,  the  working  of  the  CAP  has  been  the  subject of 
misg1v1ngs  -and often of  open  criticism - for years.  This  has  focused 
especially on  our  export  policy. 
The  Americans  have  long  reproached  us  with  being  protectionist.  However  for  a 
number  of  products  (sugar,  meat,  milk)  the  American  market  is  one  of  the  most 
protected  in  the  world.  Moreover  the  Americans  still enjoy  a  "waiver"  which 
gives  them  almost  carte blanche  for  their  import  policy.  We  are often accused 
- wrongly  - of  being  a  bit careless  about  the  GATT  rules. - 3  -
Objection is  taken  to  our  growing  share of  world  trade,  whereas  the  Community 
is still by far  the biggest  importer of  farm  produce  in  the world  (50,000 
million ECU),  with a  deficit  in our agricultural  trade balance with  the United 
States of  around  5.000 million ECU. 
We  are attacked for  the  excessive  cost of  our  Common  Agricultural  Policy, 
whereas  on  the other side of  the Atlantic a  similar amount  is paid out.  In 
the  recent  past  there  have  even been years  when  the  cost of  supporting 
American agriculture was  appreciably greater  than  the  cost  of  supporting 
Community  agriculture. 
As  regards  our export  policy,  whatever its faults,  at least you  can  understand 
how  it works,  since  we  have  only  one  export  instrument at our disposal,  that 
is,  refunds. 
In  the  United States  the  machinery is more  complex,  with other instruments, 
such as  PL  480  and  export credits. 
It may  be  true  that  the working  of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy influences 
international  trade  in farm  produce;  that  is also  true of  American 
agricultural  policy. 
Recent  developments  in connection with  the new  Farm  Bill and  the  recently 
announced  Export  Bonus  Program are  an  illustration of  this. 
Personally  I  think  that  mutual  recriminations  - snapped  up  by  the  media  - are 
less  important  than  the  realization  that  on  both sides  of  the Atlantic  there 
is an  intrinsic need  to adjust  our agricultural policies. 
The  reasons  for  this are  common  to  us  both,  namely  the  limits  placed  on  the 
growth not  only of  our budgets  but  also of  our  production. 
Like  it or not,  we  are  being  forced  more  and  more  to  bend  to  the  discipline of 
the market. 
To  that extent it is  completely understandable  that  the  US  administration is 
trying on  the  one  hand  to  reduce  the  level  of  support  for American agriculture 
and  on  the  other  hoping  to sell a  large  part  of  its enormous  stocks  on  the 
world  market. 
Similar considerations  in the  Community  led last year  to  a  series  of 
far-reaching  changes  in  the  operation of  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy. 
For  a  number  of  products  we  have  set clear  limits  to  growth  :  the  introduction 
of  the  quota  system  for  milk  is  the  best  illustration of  this.  Guarantee 
thresholds  have  been  introduced  for other  products. 
As  far as  stocks  are  concerned,  we  share  the  same  concern  as  the  US 
authorities.  It is  in  the  common  interest  to  sell off  surplus  stocks  -
whether  of  butter or meat  - since  continuing surpluses  depress  the  world 
market  for  everybody. - 4  -
These  same  financial  considerations are  forcing  the  Community  to choose  a  more 
market-oriented price policy for  the  future. 
Just as  the  US  administration must  from  time  to  time  reach  compromises  with 
Congress,  the  European  Commission  must  take  into account  the views  of  the 
Council  of Ministers. 
However,  this  does  not alter the fact  that  there  is a  clear difference of 
objectives  between  the  American  and  the  European  approach. 
Our  American partners are stating quite candidly that  what  they seek is a 
larger slice of  the world  market  by  keener pricing. 
From  their point of  view,  this  simply means  the  recovery of  ground  gradually 
lost over  the  past  few  years. 
As  they see it, moreover,  almost all of  this  ground  has  to be  won  back  from 
the  European  Community. 
Our  aim  is more  modest.  We  are  trying  to adjust our cereals policy so  that we 
maintain our  present share of  the  world  market. 
An  American  policy which  aims  to enlarge its share of  the  market at our 
expense  is undoubtedly striking at the essential interests of  European 
agriculture.  This  cannot  be  without  consequences  as  far as  imports  are 
concerned. 
If  we  cannot sell so  much  wheat  on  the world market,  it will  find  its way  to 
the  European  feed  industry and  this will,  of  course,  be detrimental  to 
imported feedingstuffs. 
In other words,  there are  a  number  of  parallels between  the  policy adjustments 
being made  on  both sides of  the Atlantic but  there  is also a  clear difference 
in approach. 
Both  the  Americans  and  ourselves are opting for  a  more  market-oriented policy 
because of budgetary  problems  which  are  common  to  us  both;  in  the cereals 
sector,  however,  the Americans  are  pursuing an expansionist export  policy 
which  is detrimental  to  the  European  share of  the  world market  and  which will 
almost  inevitably place  us  on  a  collision course. 
This  brings  me  to  the adjustment  of  our  cereals  policy. 
It is no  accident  that cereals prices  have  been  a  key  issue  in  the  EEC  price 
negotiations.  There  is clearly more  at stake  than  the scale of  the  price 
reduction for  the  coming  marketing year.  The  fundamental  controversary 
concerns  the  function  of  the  price  instrument,  particularly in  the cereals 
sector. 
There  are still Member  States which believe  that our  pricing decisions  can 
serve  two  masters at once:  incomes  and  the  market. - 5  -
These  Member  States must  recognize  that even if we  can stabilize cereal 
production at 150-160 million  tonnes  in  the  1990s  (which  is an optimistic 
assumption)  and  keep  our  share of  a  slowly increasing world market  (another 
optimistic assumption),  we  will still be  left with  a  cereals surplus  which  we 
are unable  to  dispose of.  Appropriate  price  policy can  play a  major  role in 
reducing  this  problem of  surplus  production. 
Basically,  there are only  three outlets for cereals:  exports,  human  and 
internal  consumption  in feedingstuffs  and  industrial processing. 
The  latter will  provide  no  miraculous  solution. 
Thus,  adjustments  to  our  cereals policy will  mean  taking a  fresh  look at both 
exports  and  imports.  As  regards  exports,  there is,  in my  opinion,  no  doubt 
that our  present share of  the  world  market  can  only be  maintained if we  bring 
our export  prices  into  line with world  market  prices. 
Similarly,  given  low  world  market  prices  (and  very  probably  an  unfavourable 
relationship between  the dollar and  the  ECU),  makeshift  solutions will,  in my 
opinion,  be  quite  out  of  the  question.  By  this,  I  mean  maintaining  a  fairly 
high level of  internal prices,  on  the  one  hand,  and  making  upward  adjustments 
to  our export  refunds,  on  the  other. 
In financial  and  political  terms,  this is out of  the  question. 
Lower  prices will eat  into  the  incomes  of  some  of  our  farmers  and  ways  and 
means  will surely have  to be  found  of  cushioning  the  impact  of  this. 
We  need  lower  prices  if we  are  to  compete  on  the  world market.  But  it is also 
a  fact  that  lower  cereal prices may  also  have  important  consequences  for 
imports  of  cereal substitutes. 
The  adjustment  of  our  Common  Agricultural  Policy and of  the  export  policies of 
our major  partners  cannot  fail  to  have  repercussions  on  the  compound  feed 
industry. 
The  major  expansion of  the  compound  feed  industry in the  past  was  essentially 
caused  by  three  factors  : 
specialization  in agriculture,  as  a  result of  which  fodder  cereals were 
consumed  in ever smaller quantities on  the  farms  on  which  they were 
produced but  were  instead marketed  through  the  compound  feed  industry; 
the  high  cereal  prices,  replacing cereals  by  cheaper substitutes. 
the  steady expansion of  milk and  meat  production. 
It should  be  borne  in mind  here  that  these  phenomena  did not  occur 
independently  of  each other  and  are  closely connected with  the  enormous  rise 
in productivity achieved by  farmers  over  the last  25  years. - 6  -
The  decline of  mixed  farming  and  the  trend  to specialization of our  farms  has 
been marked  and  although not  yet  complete,  the  process  has  nonetheless  reached 
a  certain natural  limit.  It is estimated that  31  million  tonnes  of  cereals 
are still fed -to  animals  on  the  farm  on  which  they are  grown.  This  is less 
than the  quantity imported as  animal  feed. 
The  greatest restriction on  the  growth of  the  animal  feed  industry lies 
undoubtedly  in  the  constraints on  the  end product.  After spectacular rises  in 
the  supply  and  demand  for  meat  and  milk  products,  both  in the  Community  and  on 
the world market,  further  expansion  is now  limited.  The  consumer  is well 
supplied and not  prepared  to  buy  more  at current prices.  This  message  has 
been  received  somewhat  belatedly by suppliers with  the  result that  cold 
storage warehouses  are  overflowing with meat  and  butter.  The  effect has  not 
gone  unnoticed  in the  animal  feeds  industry.  The  quotas,  which will 
inevitably result in a  fall  in the number  of  dairy cows,  may  also  have  a 
healthy influence  on  meat  production  to  the extent  that most  beef  production 
is complementary  to milk production.  Restrictions  in the dairy sector may 
well be necessary for  a  long  time  to  come.  The  question is whether or not  the 
mandatory restrictions can  be  replaced by  limits  of  a  voluntary nature. 
The  trend of  the  last  ten years  is  therefore very unlikely to  continue.  This 
could  also be  the  case with  the  use  of  basic  commodities.  It has  become  clear 
that,  with a  self-sufficiency rate  in cereals of  130%,  the  Community  must 
offer more  competitive  prices.  This  would  reduce  the  comparative  advantage 
offered by  cereal substitutes and  stimulate demand  for  home-produced  cereals. 
After  a  steady  rise in  the  use  of  cereal substitutes  in animal  feed  rations, 
the  consumption  of  home  grown  cereals  have  recently  increased by  6  million 
tonnes.  This  is again  a  matter  of  relative prices. 
Just over  a  year ago,  soya  extract cost nearly  50%  more  than wheat.  Now  wheat 
is dearer  than  soya.  Manioc,  corn gluten feed  and  wheat  bran were also 
abnormally  expensive  last year.  So  we  should not  be  surprised  to  find  that 
last year  the  use of substitute meal  products  fell  below  the  level  reached  in 
1980.  This  year,  we  are operating along  the  lines set  in 1983.  The  changes 
in 1984  show  that as  cereals  get  cheaper,  less substitutes are  imported.  We 
must  also bear  in mind  the  gradual  increase  in the  Community  production of 
oilseeds and  protein plants,  which also  relieves  the need  for  imported 
proteins,  and  the  fact  that  the nutritional value  of  grain substitutes is 
being  increasingly appreciated  in  the  producing  countries. 
A reasonable  conclusion is  that  in  the  future  the  manufacturers  of  animal  feed 
will  be  buying  more  of  their  requirements  on  the  European market. THE  CHAMBER  OF  COMMERCE  OF  GREATER  KANSAS  CITY 
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I  come  to  Kansas  City - the  farm distribution centre of  America  - after a  two 
day visit to Washington where  there  was  much  to  talk about with several of 
your  political and  administrative  leaders. 
They  told  me  a  lot of  things  on  Capitol Hill  and  so it is important  for  me  to 
have  this very welcome  opportunity  to  see  whether all  I  was  told  in Washington 
is what  Americans  really feel  here  in  the  heartland of  rural  America~ here 
where  so  much  hardship  is being suffered by American  farmers. 
Farm  policy on  both sides of  the Atlantic  is at  the cross  roads  and  what  is 
more  a  cross  roads  where  we  in Europe  have  altered direction. 
World  trading conditions  for most  agricultural  goods  are not  what  they were. 
Nor  are  the  buoyant  conditions  experienced  for  over 40  years  up  to  the early 
eighties  likely to  return in the  foreseeable  future.  We  are  thus  bound  to 
adapt our  policies  to  take  account of  these  changed conditions.  In  the  United 
States  the  Farm  Bill  is at an  evolutionary stage.  In  Europe  we  have already 
taken  some  very difficult steps  and  have  committed ourselves  to further 
far-reaching  changes. 
Commercial  demand  on  world  markets  is now  well  satisfied.  Market  prospects 
for  the marketing  year  which  has  just started are  not  very prom1s1ng.  Crops 
are  expected  to  be  good  in  the  Western  world  but  may  also  be  large  in  the  USSR 
which  is not  good  news  for either of  us. 
Virtually all  the  main  exporting countries  have  contributed over  the years  to 
replacing shortages  by  surpluses. 
United  States  farm  output  went  up  by  some  40%  in  the  decade  prior  to  its  peak 
in  1981.  For  crop  production  upon  which  United  States agriculture is  so 
dependent  for  its exports,  the  figure  is  50%. 
The  European  Community  also  increased its  farm  output  over  this period,  by 
some  20%. 
Production increases  were  recorded  in many  other parts of  the  world.  For 
example,  China,  once  a  big  customer  for  wheat,  has  now  become  a  corn exporter. 
Both  our agricultural  policies were  adapted  to  a  change  in the  trends  in world 
trade.  That  there  is now  an  urgent  and vital need  to meet  the  new  conditions 
brought  about  by  the  success  of  these  policies is  now  being  honestly 
recognized. - 2  -
Before  I  analyse  how  we  should measure  up  to our responsibilities,  let  m e  say 
this.  Not all the  problems  can be  solved,  even if the political will  is 
present.  But  the  insoluble  problems are often those  which are  false or 
imagined.  The  others,  given  the  political  will, are all capable  of solution. 
It is  therefore  i mperative  to distinguish between  the real and  the  imaginary 
problems  in order  to  focus  correctly any  remedial  action. 
It is a  basic  hwnan  weakness,  when 
place  the  responsibility for one's 
known  in the world of agriculture. 
European Community.  It is  invoked 
to  those on  the opposite shore. 
confronted wi th difficulties,  to seek  to 
plight upon  others.  This  react ion is well 
It occurs  between  the Member  States of  the 
on  both sides of  the Atlantic,  with respect 
For example,  a  thesis  which  has  many  supporters  in  the  United  States,  is  that 
the  acute  problems  now  facing  American  farmers  stem directly  from the  various 
m echanisms  of  the  Common  Agricultural Policy.  I  do  not  believe  that  thesis 
stands  up  to examination. 
In  the seventies,  when  international markets  were buoyant,  world  trade  in 
agriculture expanded  by  some  15% per annum.  There were  few clouds  on  the 
horizon. 
When  world  trade in agriculture  took  a  downturn  in the eighties, certain 
things  became  more  apparent: 
*t he  interdependence of agriculture on  a  world  scale became  more  obvious 
*the desire to find  scapegoats  grew. 
The  scapegoats  have  been  found,  and  they  take different  forms. 
For some,  it is  a  dissatisfact ion with  GATT  provisions.  One of  the  reasons 
for dissatisfaction stem s  directly from  the exceptions  which were  made  from 
the  basic GATT  rules  for  pr imary  products. 
But  these exceptions were  not  i ntroduced at the  insistence of  the Community  or 
its ~1ember States.  They  were  introduced  by  the  United States,  because 
Congress wanted  them,  in order to maintain U.S.  domestic  prices above  world 
levels. 
These  exceptions still form  par t  of  the  rules  in force .  In  particular there 
is  the  "waiver",  granted  on  a  temporary basis  to  the  United States over  30 
years ago.  There  is also a  general derogation  permitting export subsidies on 
primary  products.  When  this derogation  was  examined  by  GATT  in 1958,  the  USA 
was  foremost  in rejecting  calls for a  prohibition of export subsidi es  on  such 
products. - 3  -
These excepti ons  and  derogations  existed when  the  Common  Agricultural  Policy 
was  set  up.  The  Community  was  not grant ed  a  "waiver".  It obtained  the right 
to  support  i t s  internal prices  above  world  levels  through  import  levies  and 
export  refunds  - and  it purchased this r ight  by  consol idating its import 
duties on  a  number  of products. 
Let us  al so not  forget that  the Common  Agricultural  Policy was  set up  soon 
after food  ration books  had  been discarded in  Europe  and  starvation remained 
in  the  minds  of  many  of our  people. 
The  backbone of  t he  Common  Agricultural  Policy  i s  its system of  intervention, 
import  levies and  export  refunds.  Although  this system  is compatible with the 
GATT,  i t  suffers  from a  particular  disadvantage. 
Its m echani sms  are clearly visible.  It  is  'transparent' . 
But it is an error  to assume  that  is mechanisms distort  trade more  than other 
less visible  tools . 
A good  example of  the  less visible  tool  is special credit programmes  for 
agriculture.  Such  programmes  have enabled  farmers  in some  countries  to enjoy 
access  to  loans at lower  interest rates  than other sectors of  the economy. 
Thi s  stimulus  to agriculture  cannot  fail to have an  impact  on  international 
trade. 
Another example,  which  is wrongly  considered  to  be  more  trade-neutral  is  the 
system  of deficiency payments. 
This  too can have  a  m arked  impact  on  production,  consumption and  t rade.  The 
United Kingdom,  before  i t  joined the Community,  applied a  deficiency paym ents 
system.  But  its agricultural  production and  consumption developed  for each 
main  commodity at similar rates  bot h  before  and after it switched  to  the 
Common  Agricultural Policy.  Thus  the  theory of  the  distorting effects of  the 
Community system are not  borne out  by  the facts. 
The  essential  point  is  that few  support m easures are neutral  with respect 
either to  production  or  t rade. 
Consequently,  if we  focus  attention on  the  trade distorting effects of  one  or 
other policy instrument,  we  may  deflect attention  from  the  underlying 
problems.  This may  enl iven the debate,  but will not  enlighten it. - 4  -
Fourth,  no  exporting country  can reasonably claim any  right  to  hold  on  to  the 
highest share of  the  world  market  forever,  or  indeed any specific market, 
which it attained at  some  date  in  the  past.  Elementary mathematics  show  this 
to  be an unattainable objective for exporting  countries generally.  However, 
this objective appears  to  form  a  central  part of  the  Export  Enhancement 
Programme. 
In present  and  foreseeable  market  conditions,  including a  somewhat  lower  US  $ 
parity,  it would  be  highly ambitious  for  U.S.  agricultural exports  to  regain 
their market  shares  which  peaked  in  1981.  We  know  what  it is  like  to  lose 
market  shares  having  lost a  large part of  the  world's dairy product  market 
through  U.S.  food  aid  programmes  and  through  plain old-fashioned  subsidies. 
But,  to  return  to  the  chronic  scapegoat  syndrome  and  limiting myself  to  the 
wheat  issue,  it should be  interesting for  you  to  learn  that since  1981  (the  US 
peak  export  year)  our  share  of  the  world  market  for  this  product  remained 
stable.  So,  it seems  that  if  the  real  culprit  could  not  be  found  - a 
convenient  scapegoat  in the  shape  of  the  Community  has  been  produced. 
The  Community  which  would  in normal  circumstances  hope  and  expect  to  remain 
your  best  customer  is  puzzled  by  this  treatment. 
Another  serious misrepresentation of  the  Community  in  the  US  is  the allegation 
of  our delaying  the start of  a  new  GATT  (General  Agremeent  on  Tariffs and 
Trade)  round.  I  cannot  emphasize  too  strongly that  the  EC  favours  such a 
round  and  has  declared  publicly its unanimous  support  for  this.  What  we  want 
is a  well  prepared  round  - both as  regards  agenda  and  participation. 
We  do  not  exclude  discussion of agricultural  issues  as  part of  a  well  balanced 
package.  But  we  do  point out  that  there are certain priciples of  our  farm 
policy that  we  would  not  abandon.  Just as  I  am  sure  that  there are similar 
values  that  you would  not  sacrifice here. 
I  should  add  that  we  want  to  deal  with a  new  round  in a  comprehensive  way  and 
tackle  some  of  the  fundamental  problems  which  jeopardize  harmonious  trade 
development  such  as  the volatile monetary  situation to  which  international 
trade  is exposed. 
We,  in Europe,  are  firmly  convinced  of  the  valuable  framework  of  the  GATT 
within which  to  resolve  trade  problems.  The  GATT  has  played a  central  role  in 
improving  the  prosperity of  the  Western  world  over  the  past  four  decades.  It 
is  the basis  of  the multi-lateral  trading  system  and  it should  stay  that way. - 5  -
In  so far as  agriculture is  concerned,  it seems  to  me  that  the  time  has  never 
been riper  to discuss  these  problems  and  we,  in Europe,  are willing  to 
re-assess our  internal and  external policies  in the appropriate  GATT 
Committee.  This  is  an  important  point  on  which  Secretary BLOCK  and  myself 
fully agree. 
As  the world's  two  largest agricultural super  powers  we  bear a  heavy 
responsibility  to  face  this  awesome  challenge.  Let  us  both accept it with a 
determination  to  succeed and  a  realisation what  failure would  bring. 0  OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE_EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
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